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FROM PyRAMIDs TO DIAMOnDs: LegAL  
PROcess OFFshORIng, eMPLOyMenT sysTeMs, 
AnD LAbOR MARkeTs FOR LAwyeRs In The  
UnITeD sTATes AnD InDIA
sAROsh kURUvILLA AnD eRnesTO nOROnhA*
In this article, the authors argue that offshoring of legal work from 
the United states has contributed to the fracturing of the long-
established internal labor market arrangements in large U.s. law 
firms. Drawing on evidence from the United states and India on 
legal employment, the growth of offshoring, and the rapidly 
changing nature of work that is offshored, the authors contend that 
the changes in employment systems in law firms are likely to be 
permanent, in contrast to other researchers who suggest they are 
temporary adjustments to the financial crisis. As U.s. law firms are 
dismantling their internal labor market systems, Indian law firms  
are partially recreating them.
The legal services industry and the U.s. labor market for lawyers is chang-ing, especially after the financial crisis. both the academic and the trade 
literatures (e.g., henderson 2008a; bull and Furlong 2011) have highlighted 
a number of key trends. These include the sharp declines in revenues and 
profitability after the financial crisis, law firm bankruptcies, changes in business 
practices to reduce costs through technological solutions (e.g., e-discovery 
software), and the rise of new low-cost firms such as LegalZoom that special-
ize in the web-based delivery of legal services. Attention has focused particu-
larly on the layoffs of lawyers for the first time in half a century, the 
deferments in lawyer hiring, and the overall declines in industry employ-
ment. Finally, some researchers have focused on the consequences for labor 
and education markets, notably increased discontent among current law 
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students, various experiments to reduce the costs of a legal education 
(Tamanaha 2012), and a precipitous (and alarming) decline in the number 
of students taking the Law school Admissions Test (LsAT)—from a high of 
171,514 students in 2008–2009 to only 101,689 students in 2014–2015.
These changes have spurred debates. On the one side are those who see 
these changes as temporary adaptive strategies by law firms that will return to 
path-dependent ways of structuring employment once the economy recov-
ers. They acknowledge the upheavals after the crisis but cite the rapid 
rebound in large law firm profitability in 2011 and 2012 as evidence that 
things are returning to “normal.” This is best exemplified by burk and 
Mcgowan, who suggested that “the current downturn has simply laid bare 
and compelled greater responsiveness to circumstances and economic forces 
that have been building for some time. . . . we believe that these phenomena 
will drive some evolution in the structure and practices of the large law firm, 
but they do not threaten the viability of the basic form” (2010: 2). similarly, 
currell and henderson noted that “the current law firm model, despite 
some recent evidence, appears to be thriving” (2013: 16) and that “the 
change is more likely to be an evolution rather than a revolution” (ibid.: 2).
On the other side, those arguing in favor of a transformation (e.g., Regan 
and heenan 2010; Ribstein 2010a) highlighted changes in many aspects of 
the industry, as well as the loosening of the internal labor market (ILM) 
model (galanter and henderson 2008). Ribstein (2010a) hypothesized that 
the recession spells the end of “big law” (large law firms) and their particu-
lar employment model, and Lippe (2012) suggested a “new normal” world 
characterized by two-tier law firms. Our argument is consistent with these 
views, and our distinctive contribution is to focus specifically on one issue: 
the contribution of legal process offshoring (LPO) to the transformation of 
the ILM employment model that is characteristic of U.s. law firms.
Using theory about the formation, transformation, and dissolution of 
ILMs (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Osterman 1994; grimshaw and Rubery 
1998), we argue that the changes in the employment systems in large law 
firms are likely to be permanent because they imply a fracturing of the ILM-
based employment model (i.e., the cravath system) that has been the domi-
nant mode of structuring employment relationships in large law firms since 
the 1920s. specifically, we highlight the variety of strategies adopted by law 
firms that weaken the mutually re-enforcing linkages among elements of 
the ILM model, and crucially, we hypothesize that a surge in LPO (the off-
shoring of a large range of legal work) after the financial crisis to a “reserve 
army of labor” in India and other countries, who work at roughly 20% of 
U.s. costs, has increased the redundancy of first- and second-year associates 
in large law firms (the typical ports of entry), thus fracturing the cravath 
system. hence, the typical large U.s. law firm is transforming from its current 
pyramid shape to a diamond-shaped configuration with fewer entry-level 
associates and a larger number of mid-level contingent non–partner-track 
attorneys. To demonstrate this, we draw evidence from both archival and 
field research in the United states and India.
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Our analysis is relevant to a number of debates. First, as sako (2013) aptly 
noted, we know relatively little regarding the impact of globalization on a 
high-skill, high-status profession that is characterized by a high degree of 
occupational closure (i.e., entry into the profession is controlled through 
education and/or occupational licensing requirements) and market closure 
(i.e., only lawyers trained in the United states can practice law or own law 
firms there) (Abel 1997). second, in the context of the broader debate about 
what kinds of work can be offshored (e.g., blinder 2006), some have argued 
that professional work, involving the use of tacit knowledge and nonroutine 
problem solving requiring divergent lateral and critical thinking (sako 2013), 
is less susceptible to offshoring. The offshoring of legal work described in this 
article also breaks the preconception that lawyers’ work is intimately bound to 
the political and juridical systems of each country and is, hence, not off-
shorable. Finally, declines in the U.s. labor market for lawyers is socially sig-
nificant given that the legal profession, which has grown steadily for almost a 
century, has been a pathway to the upper middle classes for many Americans.
The few studies that have been done on the effect of globalization on 
professional occupations vary in their conclusions. Morgan (2006) sug-
gested that the offshoring of engineering services has caused median sala-
ries for engineers to remain constant between 1995 and 2005. Pounder 
(2006) studied the offshoring of both accountant and radiology work; he 
found no evidence of job declines for accountants but found that the off-
shoring of radiology work shrinks the job market for diagnostic radiologists 
relative to interventional radiologists. Thus, we have limited evidence 
regarding the employment structure responses of high-skill, high-status pro-
fessions to globalization.
Development, Transformation, and Dissolution of  
Internal Labor Markets at U.S. Law Firms
A well-established literature is available on the rationale for and characteris-
tics of ILM strategies for structuring employment. briefly, Doeringer and 
Piore (1971) suggested that ILMs are formed to promote economic effi-
ciency because of their ability to develop firm-specific skills, to draw on 
those skills over time, and to identify people for promotion (job ladders). 
These arrangements help insulate the employment of skilled employees 
from the pressures of the competitive product and labor markets and serve 
to ensure an adequate flow of skills inside the firm while promoting loyalty 
(cappelli 1995). Osterman (1994) and grimshaw and Rubery (1998) 
expanded the concept of ILMs beyond just the ports of entry and job lad-
ders emphasized by Doeringer and Piore to include forms of payment sys-
tems, job-classification systems, employment security, and the deployment 
of labor because they constitute, in Osterman’s terms, a “set of rules that fit 
together in a logical system” (1994).
The development of the employment model in large U.s. law firms, called 
the cravath system (after the founding partner of the firm cravath, swaine, 
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and Moore LLP), is a fairly classic example of a closed ILM (wholey 1985). 
As sherer and Lee (2002) suggested, the key elements of this model include 
ports of entry at which graduates from elite schools are hired, are paid the 
highest industry salaries, are trained intensively for a six-year period, and 
then undergo an “up or out” tournament in which only the best associates 
are promoted to partner. salaries for these cohorts of young associates gen-
erally move in lock-step, the promotion percentage is fixed, and the rules 
are relatively transparent. given that the intellectual capital of the firm is 
what establishes its reputation and determines revenue and profitability, 
this model of human capital development became an industry standard that 
was widely copied (slavishly,1 in the opinion of some critics) by most, if not 
all, the large firms (gilson and Mnookin 1989; galanter and Palay 1991; 
henderson 2008a). This model was reinforced by the practice of “billing by 
the hour” (Ribstein 2010a), a mechanism for evaluating performance as 
well as convincing the client how much time was spent on his or her behalf. 
This employment model contributed to law firm growth through the mech-
anism of leverage (the ratio of associates to equity partners).2 As the part-
ners in the large firms garnered more work, they had one or more associates 
working for them. galanter and Palay stated that “firms will tend to grow (at 
least) exponentially” if “each firm’s promotion percentage remains reason-
ably constant” and leverage ratios remain the same (1991: 103). This 
resulted in the pyramid shape or the inverted-funnel shape (galanter and 
henderson 2008) of the typical large law firms during the last three decades.
The widespread decline in ILMs in the 1980s and 1990s in a range of 
manufacturing industries in the United states and United kingdom has 
been debated and documented by many researchers (e.g., eyeraud, Mars-
den, and silvestre 1990; cappelli 1995; grimshaw and Rubery 1998; Jacoby 
1999). cappelli (1995), in his broad-ranging review of employment systems 
in the United states and United kingdom, argued that, in general, the cir-
cumstances that helped forge the ILMs that buffered jobs from market pres-
sures were changing and firms are relying increasingly on market forces to 
manage employees.
how do ILMs change? Osterman (1994) argued that the drivers of ILM 
change can be found across three “rings.” The inner ring represents changes 
in ILMs driven by performance considerations (e.g., cost, profitability, and 
technological development). The middle ring consists of changes driven by 
social processes that produce ILM rules inside the firm (i.e., “customs, 
norms, and policies”), and the outer ring reflects changes driven by the 
pressures from external labor market policies and institutions (such as laws 
  1A description ascribed to a Proskauer Rose partner, by henderson (2008b). galanter and hender-
son (2008) placed the origin of the cravath model in the early 1920s, and sherer and Lee (2002) sug-
gested it dates from the late 1880s. Meyer and Rowan (1977), referring to how widely adopted this model 
was among large law firms, noted that it has become an institutional myth.
  2In the top 25% of the Am Law 100 largest firms, leverage ranged from 4.96 to 8.49, whereas in the 
bottom 25% of the 100 firms, leverage rates ranged from 1.89 to 3.55. My interviews with law firms sug-
gest that many use a rule of thumb of three (i.e., associates generate three times their cost).
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and unions). In explaining the dissolution of ILMs in the 1980s and 1990s 
in manufacturing, Osterman placed primacy on the inner ring as the key 
driver of change.
The 1990s witnessed some adaptation of the cravath system, driven by 
increased demand and intense competition for elite law graduates. sherer 
and Lee (2002) documented the growth in the lateral hiring of partners, 
the hiring of lower-paid non-partner-track associates, and the expanded use 
of contract lawyers. henderson (2008b) suggested that many firms changed 
their compensation strategies from lockstep to rewarding rainmaking part-
ners and high-performing associates differently. This also resulted in the 
“de-equitizing” of the nonperforming partners. Along with the growth of 
nonlawyer managers such as marketing directors, these changes led galanter 
and henderson to conclude that “the large law firm has gradually transi-
tioned from the classic promotion to partner tournament model character-
ized by a stable and reliable set of rules that limited the options of both 
associates and partners, to a more ‘elastic’ mode. A key consequence was 
the change from the ‘funnel shaped’ or pyramid form to a ‘pitted fruit form’ 
with a firm ‘core’ of owner partners, and a fleshy ‘body’ of all types of part-
ner and non-partner track employees” (2008: 38, our emphasis).
The other elements of the cravath system remained important to the 
large firms, however, even as the traditional drivers of firm profitability were 
under stress in the early 2000s (Jones 2010; Medici and Alber 2010). For 
example, cravath, swaine, and Moore LLP raised salaries for entry-level 
associates from $95,000 in 2000 to $160,000 in 2006, setting the industry 
standard. simultaneously, productivity was declining because of associate 
pushback against “unsustainable” billable hours,3 costs were increasing 
because of new technology, and firms struggled to maintain leverage. Firms 
therefore resorted to raising their billing rates to maintain profitability. 
Jones (2010) argued that, prior to the great recession, firms were raising 
billing rates at an average of 6 to 8% per year. The employment picture for 
new lawyers remained positive, however. Table 1, which lists the employ-
ment trends between 2000 and 2012, shows that until the financial crisis in 
2008, fully 89.9% of new lawyers found employment and that 75% were 
employed in jobs that required passing the bar exam. Thus, until the onset 
of the financial crisis, the legal-services sector had not yet witnessed a frac-
turing, only a loosening, of its ILM model, a story that is consistent with 
Osterman’s prediction.
In contrast to Osterman (1994), grimshaw and Rubery suggested that 
“changes that take place in a firm’s ILM structure occur as a net result of 
transformations in each of the three rings” (1998). Our key argument, how-
ever, is that the third ring (the external labor market) has exerted a decisive 
influence. The important changes here are the sudden availability of a new 
   3Average billable hours in 2008 were 2,042, a decline from the 2,066 in 2007, and billing-hour 
requirements are lower than those of 1998 according to data from the national Association of Legal 
Practitioners (nALP). The range was between 1,956 and 2,076 hours in 2008.
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low-cost labor force in India that could do the work traditionally assigned to 
first- and second-year associates, and an increased willingness of law firms to 
use them after the financial crisis. Although the offshoring of legal back-
office work started before the crisis, the offshoring of law work became 
more legitimate after the crisis, both as a result of positive American bar 
Association (AbA) rulings and through isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell 
1983), which, as Osterman explains, can happen because of pressures in the 
external environment that establish “coercive channels of imitation” 
whereby individual employers seek to strengthen their position by imitating 
the organizational structures and practices of leading employers (1994: 
323). This type of benchmarking partially explains the popularity of offshor-
ing after the financial crisis.
The theoretical discussion so far indicates how transformation in ILMs 
takes place, but the indicators and consequences of the transformation are 
more relevant for this study. we can evaluate whether a transformation 
occurred in the ILMs of large law firms after the financial crisis with refer-
ence to Osterman and burton’s (2006) indicators. They noted that, first, 
ILMs cannot exist without employment stability, so a decline in job security 
is indicative of a transformation. second, a core characteristic of ILMs is 
that a firm’s employees are members of the firm, implying that ILMs are 
undergoing transformation if the firm engages in contracting out. Third, 
ILMs are transforming if hiring practices depart from the traditional ports 
of entry and hiring occurs at the middle levels of the traditional ladders. 
Fourth, in terms of wage setting, firms “paid attention to traditional and fair 
wage structure rather than rewarding individual performance”; hence, 
changes toward performance-based wages are indicative of transformation. 
As we show in our Results section, after the financial crisis, changes were 
present in all four of these core practices in ILMs in large law firms, 
Table 1. employment Trends in the U.s. Law Industry, 2001–2012 (%)
Year Employed
Jobs  
requiring  
the bar exam
Other 
professional 
positions
Nonprofessional 
positions
Not  
working
Continuing 
studies
Jobs in  
law firms
2001 90.0 75.9 5.5 1.5 7.6 2.4 57.8
2002 89.0 75.3 5.8 1.6 8.5 2.5 58.1
2003 88.9 73.7 5.7 1.6 8.4 2.7 57.8
2004 88.9 73.2 5.3 1.4 8.6 2.5 56.2
2005 89.6 74.4 5.1 1.4 8.2 2.2 55.8
2006 90.7 75.3 5.1 1.3 7.0 2.2 55.8
2007 91.9 76.9 5.1 1.3 5.8 2.3 55.5
2008 89.9 74.7 4.9 1.3 7.7 2.4 56.2
2009 88.3 70.8 5.4 1.8 8.7 3.1 55.9
2010 87.6 68.4 5.6 1.9 9.4 2.9 50.9
2011 85.6 65.4 5.3 1.9 12.1 3.0 49.5
2012 84.7 64.4 4.9 1.8 13.2 2.1 50.7
2013 — 64.4 4.7 1.6 12.9 1.8 51.1
Source: nALP (2013).
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indicating that ILMs are transforming in ways that are more than just incre-
mental adaptation.
The internal consequences of ILM dissolution to the firm are well known, 
but the external labor market consequences of the dissolution of ILMs are 
less well studied. An important argument advanced by Lane, Moss, salzman, 
and Tilly (2003) is that one consequence of the dissolution of ILMs in lead 
firms is that they are often re-created in other parts of the supply chain. They 
found, for example, that food-preparation job ladders are disappearing in 
final food-service organizations (restaurants, cafeterias, and food-service 
contractors) but that these functions are being shifted to food-manufacturing 
firms, which are creating new jobs that have job ladders of their own. Inter-
nationally, recent research has shown that the offshoring of a variety of U.s. 
clerical back-office and call-center jobs to India has created not only a new 
industry in India (the business-process outsourcing [bPO] industry) but also 
a brand new labor market with identifiable ILM characteristics (e.g., kuru-
villa and Ranganathan 2008; batt, holman, and holtgrewe 2009).
global value-chain theory (gereffi, humphrey, and sturgeon 2005), 
which focuses on the level of firm interconnectedness across countries, pro-
vides a mechanism by which we can analyze the linkages between labor mar-
kets across national boundaries. gereffi et al. identified five main types of 
value-chain configurations that can be differentiated based on their mode 
of governance: market, modular, relational, captive, and hierarchy. These 
value-chain configurations vary in their degree of explicit coordination and 
power asymmetry, with low levels of explicit coordination and power asym-
metry in market-based configurations; high levels in vertically integrated, 
hierarchical configurations; and moderate to high levels of explicit coordi-
nation and power asymmetry in network configurations (modular, rela-
tional, and captive). gereffi et al. noted that choice of governance types in 
different value chains depends critically on three variables: the complexity 
of the task requirements, the codifiability of those requirements, and the 
capabilities of actual and potential suppliers in relation to the requirements. 
Lakhani, kuruvilla, and Avgar (2013) built on gereffi et al.’s theory and 
introduced a framework that focuses on the employment-system linkages 
between lead firms (U.s. law firms, in this case) and their first-tier suppliers 
(Indian LPO firms). They suggest that the influence of lead firms on the 
supplier’s employment relations varies depending on the governance type. 
For example, relational value chains with high task complexity, low codifi-
ability, and high supplier capability are characterized by supplier employ-
ment systems in which the lead firms have moderate influence, the skills 
and knowledge levels of the suppliers’ employees are relatively high, and 
employment is relatively stable or growing. In contrast, captive value chains, 
in which task complexity, codifiability, and supplier capability are similar, 
evidence a much closer connection between lead firms and supplier firms 
in terms of employment-system criteria, in which the influence of the lead 
firms on the employment practices in supplier firms is much more involved 
(see Lakhani et al. 2013 for a more detailed explication of the differences in 
governance types and employment characteristics of suppliers).
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The legal industry is characterized by value chains that are relational as 
well as captive. clifford chance, a global law firm opening its own subsidiary 
LPO firm in new Delhi, is an example of a captive value chain, in which that 
LPO office services only clifford chance globally. but the more common 
model is a relational value chain, in which U.s. law firms offshore law work 
to independent LPO firms. In both cases, the relationships between firms 
are governed by detailed service-level agreements (sLAs), in which a range 
of work standards and some LPO employment practices are dictated by the 
client law firms (e.g., to meet the strict confidentiality requirements sug-
gested by the AbA when offshoring work). some of these sLAs specify how 
Indian lawyers are to be recruited, trained, supervised, and evaluated. Thus, 
offshoring and how relationships are governed between the client firms 
(U.s. law firms) and the first-tier suppliers (Indian LPO firms) provide a 
channel through which we can examine the linkage between two national 
labor markets and, thus, explore the external labor market consequences of 
ILM dissolution.
Methodology
given our objective of understanding a rapidly changing, still unfolding, 
and not well-studied phenomena, we employed an inductive approach using 
multiple methods. Our research design is necessarily exploratory because 
few prior studies have been done on the impact of offshoring on the legal 
profession. An in-depth examination of trade publications was augmented 
by an extensive interviewing phase, in which we sought diverse stakeholder 
perspectives on the changes in the industry. we consulted with professional 
bodies, such as the AbA and the national Association of Paralegals; place-
ment firms for temporary lawyers (such as Robert half); human resources 
(hR) and administrative managers of law firms; journalists; and law profes-
sors and students. we attended conferences on the future of the legal indus-
try. The resulting 60 unstructured interviews took place during roughly one 
year, October 2012 to October 2013.
we were not successful, however, in obtaining data regarding the quan-
tum or value of work offshored from large law firms. Although we did inter-
view the partners, hR administrative heads, and employees of 12 large law 
firms (seven in the United states and five in the United kingdom4) that the 
trade journals had indicated were engaged in offshoring work, the inter-
views were of limited duration, and without exception, all the U.s. firms 
requested anonymity and none was prepared to divulge data regarding off-
shoring. Despite the brevity of our meetings with them, we found that we 
reached theoretical saturation very quickly, given that the elements of the 
large law firm employment model were remarkably similar across firms. Our 
  4Uk law firms also engage in offshoring legal work; hence, we thought getting some estimate of the 
quantum and nature of work offshored was important. with one exception, Uk firms were also reluctant 
to share such data.
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experience echoes that of Ross, who noted that “most independent observ-
ers are in consensus that LPO is on the rise. however greater insight beyond 
this overly simplistic soundbite is difficult to come by. One of the challenges 
in gauging the uptake for LPO has been the reluctance, at least until rela-
tively recently, on the part of many law firms and legal departments to pub-
licly acknowledge their LPO relationships. And together with the irrefutable 
reality that most LPOs are still privately held makes it more difficult to verify 
LPO adoption, industry revenue or headcount figures” (2012). In addition 
to the lack of firm-level data, national-level data on offshoring are also 
unavailable from both the United states and India. As Moncarz, wolf, and 
wright noted, “Few data sources exist that provide insight into the occupa-
tions that are affected by services offshoring” (2008: 71).
hence, we attempted to triangulate by examining the growth of the off-
shoring of law work from the Indian perspective, relying primarily on inter-
views with LPO managers and employees, and on figures from India’s 
national Association of software and service companies (nAsscOM), the 
primary source that tracks the Indian offshoring industry. Our main interest 
here was to get a sense of the nature and volume of work that was being 
done in Indian LPOs.
In 2015, 171 LPO providers were present in India. At the time of our 
research in 2012, this number was about 128. These LPO firms were located 
primarily in India’s major metros, with the Delhi metropolitan area account-
ing for a dense concentration of 38 firms, closely followed by bangalore, 
hyderabad, and chennai, each with about 20 firms; however, LPO firms are 
branching out to India’s smaller cities as well. And seven LPO firms have 
establishments in all the major metros. Thus, LPO firms are distributed all 
over India. given the confidentiality requirements imposed on Indian LPOs 
by their U.s.-based client firms, we found the LPO companies also largely 
resistant to our requests for research access. but by leveraging our personal 
contacts, we managed to talk to a few managers and employees, who in turn 
introduced us to other employees. Through this snowball sampling strategy, 
which we undertook in two phases, we managed to obtain 38 interviews. 
The first phase covered 21 lawyers working in LPOs in bangalore. Of these 
21, 3 were chief executive officers of LPO organizations (one of whom was 
canadian), 2 were chief operating officers, 6 were managers (two of whom 
were American), 2 were team leaders, and 10 were senior and junior associ-
ates. On learning from our bangalore interviews that LPO firms in new 
Delhi were more likely to be engaged in higher-quality legal work, we subse-
quently interviewed 17 participants in new Delhi (1 general consul to a 
LPO, 1 legal consultant to LPO firms, 5 lawyers employed as managers in 
LPOs, and 10 junior and senior associates). we cannot claim that this is by 
any means a representative sample, and most of our informants were 
employed at large LPOs. Our perusal of the websites of all 171 current LPO 
providers suggests that LPO firms do largely similar work, with several larger 
firms engaging in higher-quality work. As such, we are more confident of 
generalizing to larger LPO firms than to smaller ones, but again, our 
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purpose was exploratory, to gain perspectives about the nature of the work 
in LPOs.
All our interviews were long (lasting more than two hours), unstructured, 
and conducted outside the workplace. The focus of our interviews was to get 
a sense of what work is done and how LPO employees see their work. none 
of the participants objected to the use of an audio recorder after we indi-
cated to them that their responses and insights would be kept confidential. 
The recorded interviews were transcribed by the authors.5 because our 
interest was primarily in trying to get a sense of the work performed in 
LPOs, our coding of the interview data was organized around the different 
work categories and types, and the workers’ subjective experiences.
Results
given Osterman’s (1994) observation that ILMs form a “logical system of 
rules,” a change in one element implies a weakening of the whole logical 
system. Osterman and burton’s (2006) indicators of ILM transformation 
include changes in compensation, increased lateral hiring, employment sta-
bility, and contracting out. Firms accelerated their departure from tradi-
tional lockstep compensation to “eat what you kill” strategies for partners, 
with numerous innovations, from lockstep plateaus to full merit pay for 
associates.6 In addition, as large firms attempted to increase profits per part-
ner (PPPs), they tightened compensation for associates, as evidenced by the 
sharp declines in salaries for first-year associates since 2009 shown in Table 
2. simultaneously, firms substituted more lateral hiring for the hiring of 
entry-level associates, which is evident in the growth of two-tier partnerships 
(see Table 3) and particularly pronounced in larger law firms.
changes in employment stability are indicated by the layoffs of lawyers, 
law firm bankruptcies, and hiring cutbacks. scheiber (2013) suggested that 
during the last decade at least 12 very large law firms with more than 1,000 
partners among them have collapsed entirely. edwards (2013) noted that 
between 12,000 and 14,000 lawyers were laid off during the downturn. 
Despite two years of increasing profitability among large law firms, the hir-
ing of junior associates at large firms has not bounced back. Instead, hiring 
cutbacks continue and are, in the opinion of many of our interviewees, the 
“new normal.”7 Only 21% of leading firms hired more first-year associates in 
2012 than they did in 2011 (clay and seeger 2012). All the available evi-
dence (from the Altman weil, Lexis-nexis, and Robert half surveys) sug-
gests that law firms expect to hire more lateral associates (non-partner-track 
attorneys) in 2014 and 2015 rather than recruiting at the entry level. There-
fore, we should not be surprised that Table 1 shows a general decline (begin-
ning in 2009) in the percentage of law graduates who work in law firms. In 
  5More details on this fieldwork are available from the authors on request.
  6Interviews at three U.s. law firms.
  7Interviews with law firm administrator in new york city.
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sum, the evidence of change here is consistent with the core indicators of 
ILM transformation that Osterman and burton (2006) highlighted (we dis-
cuss the issue of offshoring in more detail in the next section).
The crisis also has prompted a questioning of the long-held belief in a 
linear relationship between leverage and profitability. For example, Macewen 
(2010), using 2008 data from selected Am Law 200 firms, found that firms 
with high leverage (3.55 to 1) have substantially lower PPPs ($490,000) than 
firms with lower leverage (1.7 to 1), which have PPPs averaging $1.4 million. 
In the 218 large law firms surveyed, 42% of managing partners saw leverage 
declines as being permanent, and only 29% felt the declines were tempo-
rary (clay and seeger 2012). As many have noted, leverage can be a firm’s 
best friend in an arena of growth, but in downturns, it is a law firm’s worst 
enemy. Another key development has been a departure from a very estab-
lished practice—“billing by the hour”—an integral component of the 
Table 3. Intensification of Two-Tier Partnerships
2009 2001 1995
All firms (%) 67.0 47.2 34.6
Firms of 100 or fewer lawyers (%) 49.6 36.3 35.0
Firms of 101–250 lawyers (%) 73.6 48.1 41.0
Firms of 251–500 lawyers (%) 77.9 56.9 27.3
Firms of more than 500 lawyers (%) 66.1 46.7 27.3
number of firms 1,571 1,234 940
Source: nALP (2010).
Note: Percentage of law firms reporting two or more partnership tiers.
Table 2. starting salaries for Law graduates
Class of year
Median individual 
starting salary
Annual percentage 
change for median 
salaries
Mean individual 
salary
Annual percentage 
change for mean 
salaries
1990 40,000 +6.7 44,290 +5.2
1995 40,000 +8.1 45,590 +3.3
1998** 45,000 +9.8 53,172 +8.5
1999** 49,000 +8.9 59,133 +11.2
2000 51,900 +5.9 67,048 +13.4
2004 55,000 0.0 71,105 +1.6
2005 60,000 +9.1 72,730 +2.3
2006** 62,000 +3.3 79,338 +9.1
2007 65,750 +6.0 86,396 +8.9
2008 72,000 +9.5 92,009 +6.5
2009** 72,000 0.0 93,454 +1.6
2010** 63,000 −12.5 84,111 −10.0
2011** 60,000 −4.8 78,653 −6.5
2012** 61,245 +2.1 80,798 +2.7
2013 62,467 +1.90 82,408 +1.9
Sources: nALP (1990–2013). **nALP (2007–2015).
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reputational model of the law firm that the cravath system established circa 
1915. billing practices today show increasing diversity, with a variety of fee 
options, including fee for service, “value billing” (tying the overall fees for 
representation to outcomes), flat rates for work done during the year, a 
fixed fee for each job completed, and a “success fee” (based partially on 
performance and outcome or a blended discounted fee).8 evan R. chesler, 
presiding partner of cravath, swaine, and Moore, noted in 2009, “It is time 
to get rid of the billable hour” (in glater 2009). Thus, after the financial 
crisis, the rate of changes in many of the elements of law firm employment 
practices noted by henderson (2008b) accelerated, resulting in a weaken-
ing of the “logical system” of rules that characterized the ILM practices of 
law firms.
The Development of Legal Process Offshoring
The limited U.s.-based data on LPO, based on annual Altman weil surveys 
of approximately the same 800 large law firms (from 2009 to 2013) suggest 
that in 2006 about 6% of firms were offshoring work. Although the 2014 
survey of the top 800 firms reported that only 10.3% were outsourcing legal 
work, that number jumped to 20.7% in firms with 250 or more lawyers. sig-
nificantly, the outsourcing of legal work was accompanied by a range of 
nontraditional staffing strategies in 2014. For example, 59% of firms admit-
ted to using contract lawyers, 55% indicated they were using temporary law-
yers, 20% outsourced or offshored back-office work, and 11% had opened 
captive low-cost centers to do a variety of jobs. Although corporate law 
departments were not part of the Altman weil surveys, evidence exists that 
at least 44% of corporate in-house legal departments have used LPOs for at 
least one task (currell and henderson 2013). clifford chance, one of the 
world’s top five law firms, increased employment at its captive Indian LPO 
from 4 lawyers in 2007 to 100 in 2012. Thus, these limited data suggest that 
the offshoring of law work has increased since the financial crisis.
The data from India also paint a consistent picture. nAsscOM’s figures 
indicate that the LPO revenues have increased from $640 million in 2010 to 
$857 million in 2011 to $1.12 billion in 2012, resulting in a 30% annual 
average growth rate. nAsscOM’s data are more reliable because they 
depend on annual reports by the LPO companies, and we found that they 
are consistent with other estimates that also suggest fast growth after the 
crisis. Lacity and willcocks (2012) noted an average annual growth rate 
between 35% and 40%, with some firms experiencing 100% annual growth 
between 2006 and 2010. The number of LPO firms in India have grown 
from 40 in 2005 to 128 in 2010 (Lacity and willcocks 2012), while our count 
in 2014 yielded 171 firms. employment growth in Indian LPOs paints a con-
sistent picture of post–financial crisis growth. The LPO industry, which 
  8Interviews 12, 14, and 17 (all at law firms).
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employed 7,500 Indian lawyers in 2006, employed 15,400 in 2010, and 
32,000 in 2012 (according to nAsscOM). Figures from nAsscOM’s annual 
report for 2013 include a projection of 80,000 employees in India’s LPO 
sector by 2015, an estimate that is consistent with the projection of 79,000 
employees by the AbA (2011) for the same year. Thus, a consistent picture 
emerges from these disparate sources.
crucially, U.s. corporate legal departments and U.s. law firms dominate 
the offshoring to India. In 2010, for example, fully 72% of the total revenues 
of the Indian LPO industry was accounted for by U.s. firms, followed by Uk 
firms (which accounted for 19%), with the remainder spread across Austra-
lia, Japan, and the Middle east (nAsscOM 2011). nAsscOM’s projections 
suggest a continuing dominant role for U.s. firms, although they point to 
faster growth in Uk offshoring to India.
This rapid growth of the LPO industry in India has been accompanied by 
industry churn, with a number of new entrants, a significant consolidation 
in terms of acquisition and merger activity, and increased investment in 
LPO firms. The year 2010, for example, witnessed a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions and the rise of global LPO firms. UnitedLex, Integreon, cPA 
global, and sDD global were involved in mergers, and Thomson Reuters 
acquired one of the largest Indian firms, Pangea3. More recently, a number 
of Indian software and bPO multinationals, such as Infosys, wipro, and 
Tcs, have entered the LPO arena.9 significantly, emerging-markets-focused 
private-equity firms such as AcTIs have begun investing in LPO companies 
(e.g., Integreon). A second trend is the growth of firms that specialize nar-
rowly on issues such as legal analysis for hollywood studios, pursuing royalty 
claims, libel lawsuits, and business incorporations. bull and Furlong noted 
that “the overall market for legal services is fracturing, it is unbundling and 
specialists are emerging and the specialist capabilities of providers (apart 
from large scale document coding) are boundless” (2011).
More important than LPO revenue growth in appreciating how the off-
shoring of law work might substitute for the work of junior lawyers in large 
U.s. firms is the changing nature of the work that LPO firms do. we catego-
rize LPO work in terms of complexity (the extent to which it corresponds to 
work done by first-year, second-year, and third-year associates in large law 
firms).10 growth is discernable in all three categories.
At the lowest end are the back-office business services (e.g., accounting, 
payroll, information technology [IT], and software systems application and 
maintenance), many of which were offshored during the boom in India’s 
bPO in the late 1990s and early 2000s (kuruvilla and Ranganathan 2008) 
for other businesses, but the offshoring intensified in the early 2000s for the 
law industry. The middle category, litigation support services, includes much 
of the labor-intensive legal work, such as legal transcription, document 
 9Interviews 18, 19, and 20 with individuals from wipro, Infosys, and Tcs.
 10Others prefer alternative categorizations. Lacity and willcocks (2012), for example, wrote of 10 tow-
ers (also referred to as industry “verticals” in India) across which firms specialize.
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conversion, legal coding and indexing, and document review and discovery. 
Many of these activities are typically done by first-year associates in large law 
firms and by paralegals in smaller firms. Typically, document review work by 
first-year associates in large U.s. firms is billed out to clients at rates above 
$200 per hour, but this work can be done in India for $10 per hour.11
The third category consists of the rapidly growing, higher value-added 
services, such as general legal research services; patent assessment; patent 
portfolio management; statutory and case law research; due diligence ser-
vices, such as technical, legal, and financial analyses of companies for merg-
ers and acquisitions; and contract drafting and review. Typically this work is 
carried out by second- and third-year associates at U.s. law firms. we found 
that companies such as sDD global and Lexadigm are doing the research 
for briefs and motions to be presented in U.s. courts and that their attor-
neys are trained for multijurisdictional research. Lexadigm has drafted its 
first brief to present before the U.s. supreme court involving a tax dispute 
related to the Fifth Amendment due process clause. both Lexadigm and 
Intellivate specialize in the higher value-added arenas, such as appellate 
briefs and patent applications (sechooler 2008). some examples of their 
work include briefs and motions for a variety of violations of U.s. laws, such 
as the Fair Debt collection Practices Act, Fair credit Reporting Act, Fair 
credit billing Act, and Truth in Lending Act. several firms we interviewed 
assist U.s. social security attorneys in filing cases and do research for filing 
de novo appeals before administrative law judges. They also provide assis-
tance to bankruptcy attorneys in preparing complaints and are making 
rapid advances in medico-legal support. A well-publicized story regarding 
the successful motion filed by an India-based LPO firm to dismiss the defa-
mation case against sacha baron cohen in the california courts (in connec-
tion with the Da Ali G show) has also raised the U.s. profile of LPO firms 
(sDD global solutions website 2013).
As firms move rapidly up the value chain, they engage in more “nearshor-
ing or onshoring,” similar to the experience of Indian software and bPO 
firms (kuruvilla and Ranganathan 2008). hence, sDD global12 and Pan-
gea3 (now Thompson Reuters) have recently opened more offices in the 
United states but hire U.s. lawyers at lower salaries. Thompson Reuters is 
“hiring lawyers, barred in any Us jurisdiction” to build multiple document 
review project teams in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and carrolton, Texas. we find 
that the LPO industry in India is moving up the value chain, which is consis-
tent with the views of other observers, such as bull and Furlong, who sug-
gested, “LPO firms are moving up the value chain with surprising speed: 
taking on the work of second, third and fourth-year lawyers” (2011: 2).
Our evidence on offshoring growth in Indian LPOs after the crisis sug-
gests that the recession was a watershed event. we are not alone in this 
 11The general counsel at ge was quoted in the Legal Intelligencer: “you don’t need a 500$ an hour 
associate to do document review.”
 12now owned by a U.s. law firm, smithDehn.
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assessment. David wilkins, director of harvard Law school’s Program on 
the Legal Profession, suggested that “[t]his is not a blip, this is a big historical 
moment” (in Timmons 2010). Professor Larry Ribstein, in an interview with 
Forbes, noted, “The financial crisis was the turning point. Law firms down-
sized rapidly as their biggest clients no longer had bottomless pockets to pay 
them. new law graduates, the canaries in the coal mine, found their jobs 
disappearing. They might have hoped that the jobs would return with the 
economy. but by then, it was too late: The jobs were going to India” (2010b).
what we have suggested thus far through our examination of India’s LPO 
industry is that both the volume and the value of law work that is offshored 
have increased since the crisis and after global value chains in this industry 
became more established, with negative implications for the employment 
for entry-level positions in large U.s. law firms. The connection between 
offshoring and entry-level employment in U.s. law firms can also be seen in 
a trade publication called the TyMetrix 2014 Real Rate Report (wolters kluwer 
2014), which recorded that the entry-level associate hours billed as a per-
centage of total lawyer hours billed (per client) was 7% in 2009 but declined 
to only 2.9% in 2011, a powerful indicator of the effect of offshoring and 
the cut in entry-level positions in the well-established ILM. notably, the 2014 
version of this report revealed a 60% drop in the ratio of hours billed by 
first-year associates over the past five years.
why did offshoring increase so rapidly after the crisis? we do not have 
conclusive answers or a conclusive inventory, but we can identify contribu-
tory factors. clearly the search for lower costs is one reason for the increase; 
Indian labor costs are between 10% and 20% of U.s. labor costs. but firms 
could contract out this work inside the United states at almost similar costs. 
For example, our interviews at Robert half (a firm that provides temporary 
legal employees) suggest that firms can hire a contract law clerk for between 
$18 and $22 per hour, paralegals for between $18 and $25 per hour, litiga-
tion legal secretaries for between $15 and $18 per hour, and project attor-
neys for between $40 and $45 per hour. During the downturn, the 
Philadelphia office of Robert half was supplying project attorneys at $20 
per hour, which is only marginally higher than Indian costs. Therefore, 
labor-cost arbitrage is not the only reason for the increase in offshoring.
The rapid maturation of the LPO industry in India has also increased 
perceptions of the quality and reliability of offshoring law work, which have 
been important drivers of the increase in offshoring volume. Our interviews 
suggest that LPO firms have largely addressed U.s. clients’ concerns about 
work quality and have developed robust technical processes and systems 
that isolate Indian employees from access to confidential information. In 
addition, Indian lawyers at LPOs are trained and supervised by U.s.- and 
Uk-trained lawyers, and many LPOs hire law graduates from both the 
United states and the United kingdom.13 Lin (2008) noted that Pangea3’s 
clients have often held “bakeoffs” in which Indian lawyers consistently 
 13Interviews 22, 23, and 24.
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trounced U.s. contract attorneys at similar legal tasks, such as document 
review and e-discovery.
Finally, offshoring is increasingly seen as a legitimate strategy among U.s. 
law firms. The Altman weil surveys (2014) showed that the percentage of 
law firms surveyed that think offshoring legal work is a permanent trend 
increased from 27% in 2010 to 50.7% in 2014. The spurt in offshoring 
occurred particularly after the AbA’s standing committee on ethics and 
Professional Responsibility outlined its position in August 2008 regarding 
the obligation of lawyers when offshoring legal and nonlegal support ser-
vices. This pronouncement was widely seen as the AbA’s having “blessed” 
offshoring. In addition, benchmarking consistent with Osterman’s (1994) 
notion of mimicry has had an effect here. Lead law firms such as Allen and 
Overy and clifford chance in the United kingdom commenced offshoring 
in 2009, a little behind U.s. law firms such as Jones Day and kirkland ellis. 
similarly, the leading in-house corporate-law departments of Rio Tinto, 
DuPont, cisco systems, and Morgan stanley also offshored legal work in 
2007 and 2008, setting a precedent for other companies to follow.14
To summarize, our examination of the development of the LPO industry 
in India suggests that the quantum and value of offshoring law work to India 
have been increasing rapidly (especially after the financial crisis); that the 
United states is the dominant offshorer of such work, accounting for the 
72% of the Indian market; and that the nature of work that is offshored sub-
stitutes for the work currently done by junior associates at U.s. law firms. In 
addition, a concomitant decline has occurred in entry-level recruitment in 
U.s. law firms, and recruitment has not picked up significantly since the 
economic recovery.
Taken together with the other evidence about ILM transformation pro-
vided earlier in this section, we argue that the immediate and potentially 
lasting impact of these developments is a change in the employment struc-
ture of large law firms. From their erstwhile pyramid shape, large firms are 
increasingly going to look diamond shaped, with a smaller intake of fresh 
law graduates, a bulging number of trained non-partner-track associates, 
and a smaller pool of partners. As Passarella, an observer of law firms, wrote, 
“Diamonds may be a law firms’ best friends” (2009).15
Changes in Law Labor Markets in India
As ILMs in the U.s. law industry are fracturing, a new type of ILM is emerg-
ing in the LPO labor market in India. Although there is a dearth of system-
atic data available on the Indian law labor market, we know that 1.3 million 
lawyers were registered to practice law under various state bar councils in 
India in 2011.16 India produces about 80,000 law graduates annually from 
 14Interviews 11 and 12 at U.s. law firms.
 15currell and henderson (2013) preferred to write of a transition from a pyramid to a tower.
 16Data are from LegallyIndia.com. we have cross-sectional data from states for particular years but no 
longitudinal data on lawyer numbers.
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906 law schools, although a majority do not enter the legal profession. bal-
akrishnan noted the poor quality of Indian legal education: “the limited 
rigour of legal training in Indian law schools and easy credentialing of the 
profession made law the most accessible ‘professional’ degree that a student 
could acquire” (2009: 134). A graduate degree in law is seen as a degree of 
last resort, with easy entry requirements (Dean 2010). Many see law as an 
entry into a political career, and for those who do not have the kinship con-
nections to enter the relatively few prestigious law firms, small-town private 
practice or alternative careers were the only options, apart from unemploy-
ment, a phenomenon commonly known as “briefless barristers” (schmit-
thener 1968). In sum, too many law schools with poor-quality teaching and 
facilities resulted in the mass production of low-quality legal personnel, 
many of whom do not work as lawyers (gandhi 2004; D’Allaird 2007).
The labor market is segmented, with relatively few elite firms (which han-
dle a disproportionate amount of the corporate legal work) and a large 
number of small firms and sole practitioners. entry into these elite firms, 
most of which are family controlled (Mendelsohn 2005), is not a function of 
merit but is based on family and kinship networks (Dezalay and garth 2004). 
elite Indian law firms emphasize training through apprenticeship but do 
not exhibit the ILM employment model that is standard in U.s. firms.
In 1988, in an effort to modernize law education and reduce the influ-
ence of the family-oriented profession (Dezalay and garth 2004), the gov-
ernment of India introduced elite undergraduate national law universities, 
now numbering 12. entry into the undergraduate program is based on rig-
orous meritocratic principles (in contrast to the post-graduate law schools). 
In 2008, seeking to increase the quality at all law schools, the bar council of 
India (bcI) specified the essential requirements for all law schools, such as 
library, technology and classroom facilities, faculty qualifications, infrastruc-
ture, and laboratory and legal resources (bar council of India 2008). In 
2011, the bcI introduced the mandatory All-India bar exam (AIbe) for 
lawyers wanting to practice in court. More than 22,000 lawyers sat for the 
first bar exam in 2011 (71% qualified).17 Today, law colleges/universities 
that are registered with the bcI and whose graduating students do not 
appear for the AIbe face disaccreditation. Thus, an effort is underway to 
professionalize the legal market. In contrast to elite U.s. schools, the new 
law universities, which attract the best applicants, have begun to place their 
students in in-house corporate legal departments; nevertheless, relatively 
few join elite law firms, where the family and kinship ties continue to domi-
nate (Dezalay and garth 2004).
The LPO industry, however, provides a new avenue of employment for 
those law graduates who do not have the kinship ties to get into elite law 
firms, do not wish to start their own small firms, or do not pass the bar 
exam. note that the Indian LPO firms recruit both law graduates and grad-
uates from other disciplines (many aspects of LPO work do not need 
 17Data are from http://www.LegallyIndia.com.
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training in law). The emphasis is on recruiting fresh law graduates who can 
be easily trained to meet client expectations rather than on recruiting those 
with litigation skills, which are of little use in LPO firms. As a chief operat-
ing officer of an LPO indicated to us, 
we do not recruit many people unless the legal skills are very good and are re-
quired for the project. we select freshers from law school who can be trained. 
why should I pay unnecessarily for experience which is not worth its billing. If 
the client is not going to pay me a premium for hiring persons with four years’ 
experience in litigation, better I hire freshers.
Thus, LPOs have increased the number of jobs for law graduates in India 
but has also created a “re-invented form of professionalism” (noronha and 
D’cruz 2012), in particular, the growth of a new professional career track 
for Indian lawyers who, ironically, will not be practicing Indian law in Indian 
courts. As one of our associates suggested,
with a mere law degree, I did not expect to make a good living but today I am 
sitting in a corporate office interacting directly with foreign clients. Though the 
kind of work I am doing is, not professional, the kind of environment is 
professional.
Another employee working in a LPO indicated:
If someone wants a steady career path and someone who wants to work in a cor-
porate environment LPOs definitely are a better option. It’s a different career 
path—a corporate commercial lawyer. It’s like bucket A and bucket b, working 
in courts is completely different game than being a corporate commercial lawyer. 
LPOs are an excellent way to go because as a lawyer in LPO, your level of profes-
sionalism is required to be very, very high. which means that client is king and 
the standard of lawyering expected from Us clients are very, very high. so no 
mistakes. you need to be very very thorough, pay attention to detail and have 
high level of writing and drafting skills which is provided to LPO lawyers.
Many of the employment practices at LPOs firms are mandated by their 
U.s. clients, consistent with the propositions in Lakhani et al. (2013) regard-
ing the employment-system connections between lead firms and supplier 
firms in the different value-chain configurations. This degree of involve-
ment of U.s. law firms in the hR practices of LPO firms is driven largely 
because of the concern with confidentiality. As noted, the AbA, although 
blessing offshoring in its 2008 opinion, laid down strict guidelines regard-
ing the confidentiality of information, particularly the names and personal 
details of the clients of U.s. law firms. These concerns have been incorpo-
rated into detailed sLAs, which have highly specific performance parame-
ters regarding how the work is done, the accuracy of the work, the workload 
targets, the six sigma processes, data security, and ethical standards; they 
also specify how LPO employees are to be recruited, trained, and retained. 
but we found that these sLAs varied across the different value-chain types. 
In captive or vertically integrated chains (e.g., clifford chance), the lead 
firm fully managed its Indian employees and was responsible for all employ-
ment systems. In the more common relational value chains, LPO employees 
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were trained and closely supervised by U.s. and british lead firm lawyers 
(Tuft 2010; noronha, D’cruz, and kuruvilla 2015). Therefore, some hR 
practices at LPOs (although not all) are determined by these agreements.
Many of these hR practices conform to the notion of ILMs. LPO firms’ 
ports of entry are direct recruitment from second-tier law schools, and they 
provide a formalized career path, with firmly established job ladders starting 
from nonlegal associates (who typically engage in low-end back-office work) 
to legal associates and senior associates (who typically do the work that first-
year and second-year associates do in U.s. law firms) to project managers 
(who supervise the associates) to the legal vice president (typically, the gen-
eral manager of the firm). A well-established compensation system exists that 
is associated with the newly created job ladders, with salaries of Rs 20,000 per 
month for a nonlegal associate, between Rs 20,000 and 30,000 per month for 
a legal associate, between Rs 30,000 and 50,000 per month for a senior asso-
ciate, between Rs 50,000 and 100,000 per month for a project manager, and 
upward of Rs 200,000 per month for a vice president (approximately $6,000 
per month). equally, formal firm-specific on-the-job training programs are 
in place, which are often carried out by british and U.s. lawyers (who could 
be LPO employees or seconded from the client companies) and by the client 
companies. For law graduates with no hope of joining elite law firms, LPOs, 
in which employment is projected to reach 80,000 by 2015, provide a new 
career coupled with the experience of work culture in a corporate environ-
ment. As a young LPO associate at cPA global told us, 
It is a good salary, good work-life balance, a new industry that provides transport 
to and fro from work, and a free lunch!
Another LPO manager noted,
In the legal fraternity it takes 10–12 years to establish your name. If you have no 
background it takes longer than that. . . . in an LPO firm if I move from the base 
level to a Quality Analyst, from Quality Analyst to a Team Lead, Team Leader to 
a Team Manager, the jump is constant. It is a straight graph. . . . LPO firms offer 
great career path. I know lawyers with 5–7 years of experience managing 20 cli-
ents and a team of even 50–60 lawyers.18
we obtained consistent reports from all our interviewees that the career 
paths at LPOs were clear and much faster than in regular legal firms. yet 
another manager in an LPO indicated, 
The opportunity of growth in an LPO is relatively higher as compared to law 
firms. I would say, if somebody is deserving they would get promoted in about a 
couple of years, right? There are people in the company who started ten or 
twelve years back, and at present they are vPs [vice presidents]. becoming a vP 
in ten, twelve years is a big achievement.
Thus, a new professional track, with clearly established ports of entry and 
ladders (the hallmark of an ILM employment system), along with extensive 
firm specific training,19 appears to be gradually developing for Indian 
 18Interview with two LPO employees.
 19For a detailed description of training systems inside LPOs, see noronha et al. (2015).
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lawyers who cannot get into elite law firms; it thus serves as a new avenue for 
upper-middle-class mobility for this group of Indian law graduates. Of 
course, the establishment of a new professional track does not necessarily 
mean that a classic ILM is developing in the Indian law labor market. It is 
indicative, however.
Conclusion
Using an ILM perspective, we have demonstrated that the long-established 
ILM model (the cravath system) in large law firms is beginning to fracture. 
we find that the offshoring of law work to India has rapidly increased, spe-
cifically the work hitherto done by junior lawyers in large law firms, and that 
the hiring of first-year associates by U.s. law firms shows a concomitant 
decline. And consistent with Osterman and burton’s (2006) indicators of 
ILM transformation, changes are evident in many of the practices that “fit 
together in a logical system,” notably in job security and stability, compensa-
tion systems, billing practices, and external hiring. consequently, the pyramid-
like shape characteristic of large law firms with well-developed ILMs is giving 
way to a more diamond-like future configuration, with a lower intake of fresh 
associates. In contrast to those analysts who argue that law firms are likely to 
return to path-dependent ways of organizing their employment relationships 
once the financial crisis is over, what we see is the beginnings of a permanent 
change in the law firm employment model in the United states.
The limited evidence available thus far is consistent with our argument. 
establishing a definitive causal connection between the offshoring of law 
work (or its domestic outsourcing, for that matter) and the declining employ-
ment of junior associates would require case-study evidence from law firms, 
which was not forthcoming. nevertheless, our evidence, drawn from a variety 
of sources and from fieldwork that helped us understand the growth and 
changes in the nature of work being offshored, makes our argument highly 
plausible. The offshoring of law work is a newly discovered avenue for cut-
ting costs and increasing PPPs that law firms are highly likely to capitalize on. 
clearly, a global value chain is developing in the legal industry. Future 
research may be able to study the variations in the governance of these legal 
value chains when the firm/network-level data become more available.
More generally, our results suggest that, despite the high degree of occu-
pational and market closure enjoyed by the high-skill, high-status legal pro-
fession, the response of law firms to the changing economic pressures, in 
terms of the transformation in ILMs, is no different from responses in other 
well-studied manufacturing and service industries. Admittedly, our analysis 
focuses only on larger law firms, but as this case has suggested, large law 
firms play a pivotal role in structuring labor market behavior. Our research 
on the legal profession directly responds to sako’s (2013) call for more 
research on the effects of globalization on the professions and suggests that 
even professional jobs involving lateral thinking are subject to offshoring. 
whether our argument generalizes to all professional services is not clear 
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because many high-skill occupations have different employment structures 
(and face different economic environments). Our argument is most rele-
vant for subsets of some professions, such as accounting firms, that have 
similar employment structures and for the high-skill, high-status academic 
profession, in which the refusal to give students college credit for courses 
taken from ed-X and coursera (academics are engaging in market closure!) 
is preventing the outsourcing of academic courses.
Although our research is illustrative of the way globalization is reshaping 
the labor and educational markets for law, our results are bounded. we are 
talking about the U.s. legal-service market, which was both particularly hard 
hit by the financial crisis and which tended to have highly developed and 
rigid ILM policies. The legal-services market in many other countries was 
not hit as hard by the recession and is characterized by medium-size law 
firms in which lawyers perform more integrated tasks. In addition, the 
United states and India are more closely tied in terms of language and legal 
system, which is not true to the same degree for other countries (other than 
the United kingdom, which also offshores legal work to India, and Australia 
and canada, which have begun to do so). A second limitation is that we do 
not have estimates of the domestic outsourcing of law work, which may (or 
may not) be larger than the work that is offshored.
Our results are consistent with the theoretical perspectives highlighted by 
Osterman (1994) and grimshaw and Rubery (1998), and they extend the 
ILM literature by integrating global value-chain theory to substantiate the 
argument that while ILMs are transforming in one place they are being par-
tially re-created in other parts of supply chains. Our case here is illustrative 
of how the national labor markets for professional services, at least in this 
particular instance, appear to be increasingly intertwined.
Finally, our results provide some empirical confirmation of one of the 
societal consequences of the decline in ILMs in high-wage, high-skill profes-
sional services, as highlighted by a quotation from Professor william hen-
derson, reported by bronner in the New York Times: “Thirty years ago if you 
were looking to get on the escalator to upward mobility, you went to busi-
ness or law school. Today, the law school escalator is broken” (2013). A simi-
lar escalator, however, is being rebuilt—but in India.
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